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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of pharmaceutical patents is one which has spurred much
litigation. While pharmaceuticals have long been recognized as patent-
able, quite a few cases have been raised regarding the utility and safety
of pharmaceuticals.1 Though utility is clearly a necessary element of any
patent, the safety requirement was added out of fear that a government
patent would be perceived as a stamp of approval on the safety of the
product. 2 The safety questions of pharmaceutical patents were largely
laid along the wayside when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
gained prominence and began to require consumer drug products to pass
FDA tests.
The pharmaceutical business is dominated largely by two types of ent-
ities: large, research-intensive corporations, and the smaller "generic"
drug "knock-off' artists. Because the former organizations have to put
so much of their budget into research and development (R&D), a form of
* J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1991. He has been working as a clerk
to a special master at the United States Claims Court in Washington, D.C.
' See generally, Deborah H. Brand, Utility in a Pharmaceutical Patent, 39 FOOD
DRUG COSMETIC L. J. 480 (1984); See also H.I. FORMAN, THE LAW OF CHEMICAL
METALLURGICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS (1967).
2 Utility is required under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The danger with utility of drugs
involved the difficulty of separating the bona fide remedies from the snake oils
and salves of charlatans. See Brand, supra note 1, at 483.
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investment which is often akin to pouring money into a hole, the 17-year
exclusive monopoly of a patent is often the only way such a company can
remain profitable. However, because of a concern for public safety, all
substances prepared for human consumption must be put through exten-
sive testing by the FDA. This testing could take a long period of time,
and it was feared that any substantial FDA tests would eat up the mo-
nopoly period, putting the development-oriented drug companies out of
business.3 Companies might have a miniscule period of time in which to
recoup their often phenomenal research investment before the generic
drug manufacturers would come in and undercut the market with cheaper
versions of the same drugs.4 Responding to lobbying efforts of large phar-
maceutical companies, Congress enacted a series of statutes to address
what legislators saw as "two unintended distortions of the 17-year patent
term."5
II. STATUTORY REFORMS
In 1984, Congress revised the United States Code with two somewhat
conflicting objectives: encouragement of expensive pharmaceutical re-
search and availability of affordable consumer drugs.6
I "The skyrocketing costs of new drug R&D are in fact foreclosing many small
businesses and universities from commitments in pharmaceutical development."
Brand, supra note 1, at 490.
4 Or so the pharmaceutical companies would like us to believe. It is more likely
that brand names are more durable than this, especially in light of the large
percentage of doctors making brand specific prescriptions. See Linda Snyder,
Prescribing for the Drug Stocks, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1978, at 121, 122; discussed
further in note 59 infra. Additionally, many old drugs are used in conjunction
with the newer generics rather than being superseded by them. Further, some
drug companies have engaged in tying their drugs with other companies' medical
services, in an effort to "extend their patent-like rights." It remains to be seen
whether this violates antitrust laws. States Charge Sandoz with Drug Typing
Scheme, 59 ANTITRUST AND TRADE RED. REP., No. 1496, at 896 (1990).
-'Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2683, 2688 (1990). See also
U.S.L.W. - Daily Edition, BNA, Inc., Aug. 27, 1990, which tracks the Eli Lilly
decision.
6 Section 156 is the most pertinent statute in 35 U.S.C. and will be dealt with
further. § 155, enacted Jan. 4, 1983, allowed for patent term extensions for certain
stays of regulation approval.
[Tihe term of a patent which encompasses within its scope a composition
of matter or a process for using such composition shall be extended if such
composition or process has been subject to a regulatory review by the Federal
Food and Drug Administration ... leading to the publication of regulation
permitting the interstate distribution and sale of such composition or proc-
ess and for which there has thereafter been a stay of regulation of approval
imposed pursuant to section 409 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act... which stay was in effect on January 1, 1981, by a length of time to
be measured from the date such stay of regulation of approval was imposed
until such proceedings are finally resolved and commercial marketing per-
mitted....
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"Under Federal law, a patent grant[s] to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, for the term of seventeen years, ... the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United States.
§ 155A (a) allows for new drug product patent restorations,
[I]f during the regulatory review of the product by the Federal Food and
Drug Administration -
(A) the Federal Food and Drug Administration notified the patentee, by
letter dated February 20, 1976, that such product's new drug application
was not approvable under § 505 (b)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act;
(B) in 1977 the patentee submitted to the Federal Food and Drug Ad-
ministration the results of a health effects test to evaluate the carcinogenic
potential of such product;
(C) the Federal Food and Drug Administration approved, by letter dated
December 18, 1979, the new application for such product; and
(D) the Federal Food and Drug Administration approved, by letter dated
May 26, 1981, a supplementary application covering the facility for the
production of such product.
§ 155A (b) provides that such a restoration will be for five years.
§ 271 (e)(1) deals with infringement of patents and does not fall within the scope
of this paper. It allows generic drug companies to use the patented drugs in testing
"solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of infor-
mation under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs." The goal here is to allow them to get approval quicker after expiration
of the new drug's extensions.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (f)4)(D)( (i)-(iv) ) attacks the problems from the FDA side,
prohibiting the FDA from approving generics for a varying number of years
depending on the length of testing and the novelty of the elements of the drug.
A totally new drug can be protected as such for up to ten years, while drugs with
active ingredients which have been patented elsewhere can get four, three, or
even two years protection depending on their reliance on prior patents.
(D)(i) If an application (other than an abbreviated new drug application)
submitted under subsection (b) for a drug, no active ingredient (including
any ester or sale of the active ingredient) of which has been approved in
any other application under subsection (b), was approved during the period
beginning January 1, 1982, and ending on the date of the enactment of this
subsection [enacted Sep. 24, 1984], the Secretary may not make the approval
of an application submitted under this subsection which refers to the drug
for which the subsection (b) application was submitted effective before the
expiration of ten years from the date of the approval of the application
under subsection (b).
(ii) If an application submitted under subsection (b) for a drug, no active
ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active ingredient) of which
has been approved in any other application under subsection (b), is approved
after the date of the enactment of this subsection, no application may be
submitted under this subsection which refers to the drug for which the
subsection (b) application was submitted before the expiration of five years
from the date of the approval of the application under subsection (b), except
that such an application may be submitted under this subsection after the
expiration of four years from the date of the approval of the subsection (b)
application if it contains a certification of patent invalidity or noninfringe-
ment described in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii). The approval of
such an application shall be made effective in accordance with subparagraph
(B) except that, if an action for patent infringement is commenced during
the one-year period beginning forty-eight months after the date of the ap-
proval of the subsection (b) application, the thirty-month period referred to
1991-92]
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35 U.S.C. § 154.' ' 7 However, § 154 cannot casually be applied to drug
patents because pharmaceuticals are subject to years of FDA testing prior
to approval.8
in subparagraph (B)(iii) shall be extended by such amount of time (if any)
which is required for seven and one-half years to have elapsed from the
date of approval of the subsection (b) application.
(iii) If an application submitted under subsection (b) for a drug, which
includes an active ingredient (including any ester or salt of the active in-
gredient) that has been approved in another application approved under
subsection (b), is approved after the date of enactment of this subsection
and if such application contains reports of new clinical investigations (other
than bioavailability studies) essential to the approval of the application and
conducted or sponsored by the applicant, the Secretary may not make the
approval of an application submitted under this subsection for the conditions
of approval of such drug in the subsection (b) application effective before
the expiration of three years from the date of the approval of the application
under subsection (b) for such drug.
Gv If a supplement to an application approved under subsection (b) is
approved after the date of enactment of this subsection [enacted Sept. 24,
1984] and the supplement contains reports of new clinical investigations
(other than bioavailability studies) essential to the approval of the supple-
ment and conducted or sponsored by the person submitting the supplement,
the Secretary may not make the approval of an application submitted under
this subsection for a change approved in the supplement effective before
the expiration of three years from the date of the approval of the supplement
under subsection (b).
(v) If an application (or supplement to an application) submitted under
subsection (b) for a drug, which includes an active ingredient (including
any ester or salt of the active ingredient) that has been approved in another
application under subsection (b), was approved during the period beginning
January 1, 1982, and ending on the date of the enactment of this subsection
[enacted Sept. 24, 19841, the Secretary may not make the approval of an
application submitted under this subsection which refers to the drug for
which the subsection (b) application was submitted or which refers to a
change approved in a supplement to the subsection (b) application effective
before the expiration of two years from the date of enactment of this sub-
section [enacted Sept. 24, 1984].
See also Abbott Labs v. Young, 691 F. Supp. 462 (D.D.C. 1988) remanded for
further agency findings, 920 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990). However, this section may
not be applicable to antibiotic drugs; see Glaxo, Inc. v. Heckler, 623 F. Supp. 69
(E.D.N.C. 1985). This section of the Code is commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments. Abbott Labs at 463. The section is considered,
a uniquely legislative evaluation of the benefit of increased availability of
generic drugs and the need for-continued research for the development of
pioneer drugs. Both subsections are part of a coordinated scheme designed
to foster these competing interests. Rather than being different their pur-
poses are complimentary.
Abbott Labs at 470. "The evident purpose of the marketing exclusivity provisions
is to reward drug manufacturers for substantial expenditures of time and money
for the development of pioneer drugs." Abbott Labs at 472. 35 U.S.C. § 271, 35
U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A, and 156, and 21 U.S.C. § 355.
7 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2683, 2688 (1990).
1 Patents are designed to promote innovation by providing the right to exclude
others from making, using or selling an invention. Patents enable innovators to
obtain greater profits than could have been obtained if direct competition existed.
These profits act as incentives for innovative activities.
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ITlhe 1984 Act was designed to respond to two unintended
distortions of the 17-year patent term produced by the require-
ment that certain products must receive premarket regulatory
approval. First, the holder of a patent relating to such products
would as a practical matter not be able to reap any financial
rewards during the early years of the term. When an inventor
makes a potentially useful discovery, he ordinarily protects it
by applying for a patent at once. Thus, if the discovery relates
to a product that cannot be marketed without substantial test-
ing and regulatory approval, the 'clock' on his patent term will
be running even though he is not yet able to derive any profit
from the invention.
The second distortion occurred at the other end of the patent
term. In 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decided that the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented in-
vention during the term of the patent constituted an act of
infringement, ... even if it was for the sole purpose of con-
ducting tests and developing information necessary to apply
for regulatory approval.
Since that activity could not be commenced by those who
planned to compete with the patentee until expiration of the
entire patent term, the patentee's de facto monopoly would
continue for an often substantial period until regulatory ap-
Although the patent term in the United States is 17 years, the period during
the patent term in which products are marketed (the effective term) is usually
less than 17 years because patents often are obtained before products are ready
to be marketed.
Effective patent terms are influenced by many factors, including Federal pre-
marketing and premanufacturing regulations. The products covered by those
regulations include pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food additives, and color
additives. Pharmaceuticals, for instance, cannot be marketed in the United States
until they have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). To
obtain such approval, drugs must undergo extensive testing to prove they are
both safe and effective. All these products are subject to different regulations that
have varying impacts on effective patent terms.
In testimony before several Congressional Committees, representatives from
the pharmaceutical firms that are heavily involved in basic research and rely
upon patents, claimed that the average effective patent term of drugs has declined.
They argued that a continuation of the decline would result in decreased ex-
penditures for research and development and eventually, in a decline in the
introduction of new drugs.
As compensation for the loss of patent term due to government review, the
research intensive firms argued for patent term extension legislation. They stated
that the legislation would create a significant new incentive which would result
in increased expenditures for research and developments, and ultimately in more
innovative drugs. THE FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984
at 179 (Allan M. Fox, & Alan R. Bennett eds., The Food and Drug Law Institute
1987) (quoting House Report Part I at pp. 17-18) [hereinafter Fox & BENNET].
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proval was obtained. In other words, the combined effect of the
patent law and the premarket regulatory approval requirement
was to create an effective extension of the patent term.9
Section 156, dealing with the first "distortion," is the most important
of the Patent Term Restoration Act sections. It allows a human drug
product patent to be extended up to five years if
[the product was] subject to a regulatory review period before
its commercial marketing or use [and] the permission for the
commercial marketing or use of the product after such regu-
latory review period [was] the first permitted commercial mar-
keting or use of the product under the provision of law under
which such regulatory review period occurred.10
Thus § 156 is generally applicable to all new drugs which were subject
to FDA testing.
With 35 U.S.C. § 156 and 21 U.S.C. § 355 protecting the drug companies
which invent pioneer drugs, and 35 U.S.C. § 271 allowing generic drug
companies to quickly begin production when patent extension periods
lapse, it is evident that Congress worked a careful compromise between
two objectives: encouraging R&D and providing inexpensive drug prod-
ucts for the consumer." But note, not all sources supported the legislative
acts. "By excluding so many patents from eligibility for term restoration,
and by making the eligibility for restoration of some patents turn on
circumstances beyond the control of the inventor, the bill falls well short
of providing the incentives for innovation that it purports to achieve.' 12
Among shortcomings noted were: problems with restoration of a patented
drug compound within a previously patented genus; allowing restoration
of only first-issued patents (despite Patent and Trademark Office (P.T.O.)
requirements of dividing some claims into multiple patents); potential
problems of single patent claims by two FDA approved drugs (where only
the former may be allowed restoration); and limitations on manufacturing
9 Eli Lilly, supra note 5, at 2688-2689; See also Fox & BENNETr, supra, at 178,
quoting House Report part I at 15.
"0 Eli Lilly, supra note 5, at 2689, quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(a); "The Committee
established different maximum periods of extensions to provide greater incentive
for future innovations. By extending patents for up to five years for products
developed in the future, and by providing for up to fourteen years of market
exclusivity, the Committee expects that research intensive companies will have
the necessary incentive to increase their research and development activities."
Fox & BENNErr, supra note 8, at 154, quoting House Report Part I, at pages 40-
41.
"See generally Fox & BENNETT, supra note 8.
"Id. at 111 (quoting House Report Part I, Minority Views of Rep. Bliley, at
75-6.)
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patents, "including the limitation that no other type of patent has been
or 'may be issued for any known therapeutic purposes' claiming the
method of using the product."''
III. DRUG COMPANIES FAIL TO LIvE UP TO THEIR END OF THE BARGAIN
A patent is a monopoly, and when anyone holds a monopoly,
that person has the ability or that company has the ability to
charge the highest price because there is no one else in com-
petition, and as a matter of public policy, we, under the patent
law, give that protection to the person who has put money into
research and development for an innovative and new product.
But at some point public policy calls for the free market system
competition which will bring about the result of a lower price
for the consumer.
14
Part of the congressional plan was to protect innovative manufacturers
from the ruinous bankruptcy of research, while the rest of the plan was
intended to hasten the less expensive generic drugs to the marketplace.
Much of this legislation was the result of drug company lobbying and
was hailed by both development and generic drug companies alike. 16
However, while the development-drug companies undeniably enjoy the
benefit of the congressional enactments, their response has been less than
appreciative. The companies' exclusive monopolies have been extended
by up to ten years to compensate for loss of profits during FDA testing. 6
13 Id. The Report continues, "The restrictive eligibility provisions of H.R. 3605
make patent term restoration a haphazard and infrequent event. Innovation is
not encouraged when the prospect of meaningful patent life is left to chance and
happenstance and when most innovations covered by patents will not be eligible
for term restoration." Id. at 112.
14 Fox & BENNEr, supra note 8, at 51 (quoting Remarks of Rep. Waxman,
House Floor Debate, CONG. REc. H9116 daily ed., Sept. 6, 1984.)
15 Fox & BENNErr, supra note 8, at iv.
Unlike other pieces of legislation ... where a specific incident, such as the
thalidomide tragedy, triggered political pressure for enactment, there was
no public outcry for this legislation. Rather, legislation resulted from com-
peting economic groups striking a compromise, taking the compromise to
key Senate and House members, and having those members personally
involved in the enactment of the legislation.
Id.
16 The ten-year figure was taken from 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(i). Though not
a "patent" statute (not within 35 U.S.C.), this mandates the FDA's not approving
a generic of a totally new drug for ten years. However, this protection period by
its terms is only limited to a drug application filed by the date of § 355's enactment.
The section more likely to be applied will be 35 U.S.C. § 156, which allows a five
year extension (up to a total of 14 years monopoly). 21 U.S:C. § 355 does not
extend the patent, but limits FDA approval of generics for a period of time,
depending on the novelty of the pioneer drug. It is not all inclusive, as it does
not cover antibiotic drugs, etc. See Glaxo, Inc. v. Heckler, 623 F. Supp. 69 (E.D.N.C.
1985).
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The companies appear to be taking advantage of these statutes and the
American public by setting prices which result in unconscionably high
profits. This is particularly egregious when the drugs patented are life-
saving drugs, and the consumers have little choice but to pay the out-
landish prices.
17
IV. THE AIDS DRUG: AN EXTREME EXAMPLE OF ABUSE
Perhaps the clearest example of drug company abuse is the overpriced
drug azidothymidine (AZT). This drug, patented by the Burroughs Well-
come company, is a life-extending AIDS remedy which originally sold at
a staggering $10,000 per year.18 The price is especially impressive in light
of the fact that approximately 1.5 million Americans may require the
drug on an annual basis. 19 This $10,000 per year per patient figure was
the highest price ever attached to a drug, but the figure appears to be
consistent with the growing trend.20 The real problem with this case,
though, is that Burroughs Wellcome was directly assisted by the United
States government to exploit the American consumers and taxpayers. A
columnist for the Washington Post summed the dilemma up succinctly,
"What, for example, is owed to the public when it supports, through the
government, development of a highly profitable product? And how can
the government assure, when it cooperates with private enterprise, pro-
tection of the public's need for life-saving drugs at reasonable costs? '21
"Burroughs Wellcome, the British multinational pharmaceutical com-
pany, stepped forward and in return received generous cooperation from
NIH [National Institute of Health] scientists, who tested the drug in the
early stages. '22 There was little the government could do once it assisted
Burroughs in attaining patentability, but it clearly felt that this pricing
was a slap in the face, "[a]nd the decision by Burroughs to charge such
a high price for AZT has led to important changes in the way government
now does business with drug companies. '23
Understandably, Burroughs was entitled to some reward for its coop-
eration. The company was the first to aggressively move the product into
production and it invested $80 million into what it described as an un-
17 Mark H. Furstenberg, AZT: The First AIDS Drug; Who Profits? Who Pays?,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1987 at Z12.18 Id. See also Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2683, 2690 n.5
(1990) for examples of excessive prices. This $10,000 figure has subsequently been
reduced to close to $3000 per year. Malcolm Gladwell, Lawsuit on AIDS Drug
Patent Seeks to End Firm's Monopoly; Patients Cite Federal Scientists' Role in
Developing AZT, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1991, at A2.
19 Furstenberg, supra note 17.
2 I1d.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. It seems that the government now would contractually reserve rights to
patented inventions it has played an active part in developing. But the AZT issue
may not yet be dead. See Recent Developments section, infra.
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certain market. 24 They had as many as 700 people working on the drug's
development, and scientists involved were required "to work with live
AIDS viruses - capable of causing disease if an accident were to occur
in the laboratory. '25 But the government feels it was taken advantage of,
as it had "contributed to Burroughs its entire stock of thymidine, the
essential ingredient of AZT" which is "both expensive to make and...
[is] in short supply. '26 In addition, the "government spent $100,000 a
month to distribute the drug. And the government made an incalculably
valuable contribution in getting the drug approved quickly and alerting
physicians that AZT was available. '27 Furthermore, "at $10,000 per pa-
tient per year, Burroughs Wellcome's revenue for the first year of sales
will be on the order of $100 million, exceeding the $80 million it says it
has invested.128 It seems Burroughs Wellcome has shirked its good will
responsibility, and left its governmental partner out in the cold. Notes
Benjamin Gordon (former staff economist of the Senate Small Business
Committee and now with the National Council of Senior Citizens), "Drug
companies charge what they can .... Whatever the market will bear."29
V. AZT - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On March 18, 1991, two HIV-infected men and the People With AIDS
Health Group filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court in Wash-
ington, D.C., alleging that Burroughs Wellcome's AZT patent should be
invalidated because the company "did not conceive, develop or demon-
strate the use of the drug in AIDS therapy, and failed to identify federal
scientists as the true developers in its patent application."3 Also named
in the suit as co-defendant is the United States government, who, plain-
tiffs claim, was the actual inventor, and could assert rights over the
patent.3 1 The suit is being prepared by Public Citizen Health Research
24 Furstenberg, supra note 17.
26 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
11 Id. Others have expressed the same sentiment. "The drug companies evi-
dently feel that they can get away with whatever the market will bear." Repre-
sentative Henry A. Waxman (D. Cal), Andrew Pollack, The Troubling Cost of
Drugs That Offer Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1988, at Al.
30 Suit Challenges Firm's Patent on AIDS Drug; Pharmaceuticals: The Expen-
sive Treatment AZT is the Only Approved Therapy that Attacks the Virus Directly,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, BUSINESS, at D2 (Home Ed.). See also M. Snider, AZT
Maker is Target of Suit, USA TODAY, Mar. 20, 1991, at 1A; AIDS Drug Patent
Challenged in Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991 (Late Ed.), at A19; M. Gladwell,
supra note 18,; Lawsuit Seeks to Strip Burroughs Wellcome of AIDS Drug Patent,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1991,; J. Price, AZT Users File Lawsuit Challenging Its
Patent, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, NATIONAL, at A4; J. Frank, AIDS Patients
Sue Manufacturer ofExpensive Anti-AIDS Drug, REUTERS, Mar. 19, 1991; R. Stein,
Patent for AIDS Drug Challenged, U. PRESS INT'L, Mar. 19, 1991.
31 Stein, supra note 31.
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Group, the consumer group founded by Ralph Nader.32 The plaintiffs'
claim largely is that much of the screening test was done by NIH-funded
government scientists, at Duke University and elsewhere, including the
National Cancer Institute (N.C.I.).33 AZT was originally created in 1964
by Jerome Horwicz of the Michigan Cancer Foundation, working on an
N.C.I. grant.3 However, Burroughs Wellcome claims that they were the
first to discover the vaccine's potential in curing AIDS. Burroughs Well-
come's spokesman, Peter Reese, noted that "some U.S. government sci-
entists offered help, and were involved in the initial screening in the mid-
1980's, but AZT's identification as an anti-AIDS drug was the British
firm's own."3 5
32Id.
Price, supra note 31.
34Snider, supra note 31.
35Frank, supra note 31. On Mar. 19, 1991, Burroughs Wellcome offered a
response to the complaint filed against them. Burroughs Wellcome Co. issued the
following:
Recent statements and activities of Public Citizen show little under-
standing of the complicated processes of drug discovery, development, pat-
ents and pricing. "Burroughs Wellcome Co. has addressed these erroneous
claims many times in the past and remains confident of its patent position
with respect to Retrovir(R) brand zidovudine (AZT)," said Phillip R. Tracy,
president and chief executive officer at Burroughs Wellcome. The idea that
our company would engage in illegal activities to obtain patent rights is
both offensive and wrong. We fully expect to prevail in the lawsuit.
Burroughs Wellcome Response to Public Citizen Action, PR Newswire, Finan-
cial News, Mar. 19, 1991.
The company cites the following additional information: Burroughs Wellcome
scientists were the first to conceive of the use of the chemical AZT for the treatment
of HIV infection in humans. This creative insight is the basis of the "use" patent
that the company received in 1988.
Burroughs Wellcome has acknowledged many times the highly skilled collab-
orative efforts of both government and academic scientists in the subsequent
development of this drug. Such work, however, does not entitle the collaborators
to be named as co-inventors on any patent.
Attempting now to challenge Burroughs Wellcome's patent on Retrovir, more
than five years after its filing, based on ill-conceived notions of the conduct of
research and the purpose of patents, could have a chilling effect on innovation
in the United States and could discourage further AIDS research.
Burroughs Wellcome's price for a 500-mg dosage regime is $6 per day (ap-
proximately $2,200 per year), which represents a 70 percent reduction in cost of
therapy as a result of price decreases and reduced dosage since the drug was first
marketed in 1987.
The company has supported in whole or in part, more than 90 Retrovir-related
clinical trials involving some 10,000 patients worldwide. We have provided more
than $40 million worth of AZT to the National Institutes of Health for use in its
studies with AZT, including those with potentially competitive therapies.
Burroughs Wellcome has a patient assistance program that temporarily pro-
vides Retrovir at no cost to qualified patients until they are able to obtain med-
ication assistance from other sources.
Wellcome has a 110-year heritage of commitment to the improvement of human
health through innovative medicines for poorly understood or inadequately
treated diseases. Burroughs Wellcome has been more effective in producing tan-
[Vol. 6:2
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The suit was filed in light of allegations that N.C.I. researchers felt
that they should have been named as co-inventors. The researchers met
with Burroughs Wellcome for a few months to discuss the issue; suit was
filed in light of the fact that an unnamed foreign drug company had
expressed its willingness to market the drug at half the price Burroughs
Wellcome currently charges. 36 The complaint alleges that Burroughs was
"less than candid" to the U.S. Patent Office when it failed to reveal that
much of the research was done by federally-funded university studies and
by the National Institute of Health.37 But it is far from clear that the
plaintiffs will make any headway in their suit against Burroughs and
the U.S.
Bob Armitage, chief patent counsel for the Upjohn Company,
said this is the first case he is aware of in which consumers
have tried to strike down a product patent. He said he sees
little likelihood this suit will seriously undermine Burroughs
Wellcome's patent position on AZT. 'Typically, the party that
selects particular compounds for testing is the one identified
as the inventor, not the party that does the actual screening.'5
VI. OTHER MANUFACTURERS ARE CHARGING
SIMILARLY PHENOMENAL PRICES
Other drug companies similarly have "taken advantage of consumers
who have no alternatives."3 9 For example,
Tissue plasmogen activator, or TPA, a genetically engineered
drug made by Genentech, Inc. for the treatment of heart at-
tacks, costs $2,200 a dose, 10 times as much as a competitive
product not made with the new technology. Human growth
hormone, another genetically engineered drug for children who
gible improvement in the lives of patients with HIV than any other single in-
dividual or group. In addition to our pioneering work with antiviral medicines,
"two common and inexpensive medications (Daraprim® brand pyrimethamine and
SeptraO brand trimethoprim and sulfamethoxazole) in wide use by AIDS patients
today" are among the achievements cited when two Burroughs Wellcome scien-
tists were awarded the Nobel Prize for medicine in 1988.
"Burroughs Wellcome is proud and confident of the contribution it has made
to the fight against AIDS, and our commitment to AIDS research and people with
HIV infection continues", Tracy said. Id.
3 Gladwell, supra note 18.
37 Frank, supra note 31.
Price, supra note 31. Though it might be beneficial to use Burroughs to make
an example that excessive pharmaceutical charges for life-saving drugs will not
be tolerated, it seems unlikely (from the allegations of the complaint) that the
complainants have any legal recourse here.39 Andrew Pollack, The Troubling Cost of Drugs That Offer Hope, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1988, at Al.
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are dwarfs that is made by Genetech and Eli Lilly and Com-
pany, can cost from $8000 to more than $30,000 a year. And
Merck's hepatitis B vaccine, the first vaccine made by genetic
engineering, sells for $120 a treatment, higher than most vac-
cines and out of the reach of developing nations, where the
disease is prevalent.
40
VII. OTHER EXAMPLES
"Merck's new cholesterol-reducing drug, called Lovastatin, can cost
$600 a year and up to $3,000 in severe cases. And some advanced anti-
biotics cost three times as much as older products."
'4 1
And finally,
The Armour Pharmaceutical Company introduced a major
drug ... the first blood-clotting factor for hemophiliacs made
using the tools of biotechnology. This purer version of Factor
VIII virtually eliminated any chance that hemophiliacs would
contract AIDS, hepatitis or other diseases from treatment.
There was one catch: This high-tech drug costs five to eight
times as much as older versions, bringing the cost of a year
supply to more than $25,000. That puts the drug out of the
reach of many patients for whom it is a matter of life and
death.4
2
There is clearly a problem with a system which rewards industry with
such a windfall, to the detriment of the ill and dying. Industry critics
insist that the companies' need for profits must be balanced with the
medical needs of the patients.4 Drug corporations defend themselves on
grounds that R&D is such a risky venture that they have huge expenses
to recoup when they finally go to market. Others insist that much of the
profits will be funnelled back into R&D for other new disease cures.44
,0 Id. See also Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2683, 2690 (1990).
According to one source, a year's dosage of Cyclosporine (used to suppress
rejection of new organs) costs from $5,000 to $7,000; of AZT (used to treat
AIDS) $8,000; of Monoclate (used to speed blood clotting in hemophiliacs)
$25,000 and of Growth Hormone (used to treat dwarfism) $8,000 to $30,000
.... Another new drug, Tissue Plasmogen Activator, used in the treatment
of heart attacks to dissolve blood clots, costs $2,200 per dose, and is pre-
scribed for only a single dose.
Id. Such examples are merely illustrative, there are likely many more overpriced
drugs filling the marketplace.
41 Pollack, supra note 40.
42 Id.
13 Id. These critics seem to feel such balancing cannot be done at the industry
level, where financial motives can be too easily shielded by excuses and justifi-
cations; such evaluations need to be done at a governmental level.
Id. quoting R. Swanson, president of Genentech Inc.
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Still others defend on the claim that "even expensive drugs can save
money over all by keeping people out of the hospital, or making surgery
unnecessary."45 Another reason for the high prices is that "[tihe rapid
advance of technology is also spurring companies to try to recover their
costs faster.."
46
Industry analysts, however, claim that the main factor in the extreme
over-pricing is not so much the increased costs of R&D, but the fact that
"companies base their prices on the value of the drug to consumers and
not the cost. ' 47 Thus, the more imperative it is to a patient that he gets
the medication, the more he will have to pay. This often results in what
Richard Kessel, Executive Director of the New York State Consumer
Protection Board, describes as "closing out people from the only drug that
is available.
48
VIII. THE COSTS AND TESTING TIMES FOR DRUGS
It would be remiss to talk about high prices without an examination
of the costs involved. When the 1984 Acts for Extension of Drug Patent
Lives were lobbied for, drug companies specified the average period of
time required to recoup the investment of the development of a new drug.
Congress considered this in light of the average and extreme periods of
time a drug could be hung up in FDA testing, plus the loss of profits once
generic companies were allowed into the market.49
To be fair, the amounts the drug companies charge may have some
basis in the reality of the business. "Estimated total costs of R&D required
up through FDA marketing approval of a new drug were $70 million and
climbing in 1981, as opposed to $4 million in 1962."5o
Because a patent continues to toll when a manufacturer is
testing and awaiting government approval, the amount of pat-
ent time remaining after the approval is less than the normal
17 years. For example, representatives of the drug industry
4 Id. quoting John Doorley, a Merck & Company spokesman.46 1d. Presumably companies need to charge more because the pace of the
competition is so much faster that a company needs ready capital to invest in the
next area of research as soon as they can recoup what was spent in the previous
area. Possibly what is meant by this is that companies need to employ new tests
and buy state of the art equipment to keep pace and such can be an expensive
endeavor. See also, Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 2683, 2695 (1990)
("Although the Court gives examples of high cost drug dosages, it does not dem-
onstrate that the testing of these drugs detracts from a patent holder's sales.")
4 Pollack, supra note 40.
43 d.9FOx & BENNETr, supra note 8.
50 Brand, supra note 1.
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have testified that the average patent time left after approval
is between 8 and 10 years. Research-intensive firms predict
that declining patent terms will result in the development of
fewer innovative products.51
Other journalists have also noted the extreme time limits and expenses
a drug manufacturer must face.
At the beginning of the 1960's, before the amendments [1962
of the FDCA] were passed, it took two and a half years, on
average, to bring a new product from the laboratory to the
marketplace. Today [in 1978] a drug company can spend as
much as ten years getting the required approval of the Food
and Drug Administration. In consequence, the cost of intro-
ducing a new drug has skyrocketed, from about $1.5 million
in 1960 to perhaps $15 million.52
5' Fox & BENNETT, supra note 8, at 181, quoting Remarks of Rep. Waxman,
Cong. Record of Aug. 8, 1984 at H8706. See also Brand, supra note 1, at 494,
which states,
Patents still nominally confer the same rights on their holders and have
the same nominal life of seventeen years. There is evidence, however, that
the expected value and effective life of a patent lies in conferring upon the
owner the rights to a legal monopoly on the sale of the product and the
hope of a de facto monopoly even after expiration. As noted above, however,
increased competition from generics is rapidly diminishing this latter phe-
nomenon.
Of course, the economic profits from discovery of a patentable drug cannot
be reaped until it is offered for sale. Therefore, the benefits of a patent do
not accrue until the drug is approved by the FDA. However, .. . the right
to enter the commercial market is not and should not be concomitant with
a patent grant, which gives only exclusive selling rights when and if the
drug is approved for marketing. As the standards for FDA approval and
patenting are divergent, there may be a significant time lag between the
grant of a patent and the time when sufficient evidence of safety and efficacy
has been accumulated to satisfy FDA's stringent requirements, and con-
sequently to realize the value of the patent.
It has been found that the effective life of a pharmaceutical patent has
in fact fallen from 16.5 years in 1960 to 9.7 years in 1978. In light of this
evidence, it is no wonder that firms are investing less in pharmaceutical
R&D. The expected return from a patent is much lower, especially consid-
ering the increased introduction of generic drugs into the market upon
expiration of the patent. Studies have also shown that in order for a man-
ufacturer to break even and just cover R&D costs involved in marketing a
new drug, he would have to market the drug exclusively for 12 to 19 years.
The conclusion in this economic analysis depends upon the interest rate,
since that rate determines the 'opportunity cost' of the funds for R&D and,
thus, the break-even level. At a ten percent market interest rate, a new
drug manufacturer will proceed with necessary R&D if he can expect a
nineteen-year product market life. As indicated above, effective pharma-
ceutical patent life now falls nearly ten years short of that break-even point.
Id.
52 Linda Snyder, Prescribing for the Drug Stocks, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1978,
at 121.
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Also, it takes an average of about eight years to get a drug
from the laboratory bench to the drug store shelf. About six of
those years are spent on tests- first on animals, then on hu-
mans. The rest of the time is taken up with the bureaucratic
processing of a drug by national regulatory authorities.
The cost of developing a new medicine in America was put at
$74 million in 1980. Companies say the figure is now [in 19841
nearly $100 million. Inventors' patents give them a head start
over the generic manufacturers to help them recover that cost
and to make a (sometimes huge) profit. In theory, the life of a
patent in the United States is 17 years (unchanged since 1861)
and of a patent in Europe is 20 years. In practice, after regu-
latory delays the effective patent life of a new drug in America
is more like 9.5 years. This dipped as low as 7.5 years in 1980.63
Thus it might be argued that the five-year patent extension of § 156
is insufficient to recompense the developer for the period of up to ten
years lost on FDA testing. And with § 271 enabling generic drug com-
panies to get up to speed faster, it is less likely that the drug companies
will always recoup the hundreds of millions they have sunk into R&D.
But even with the great costs involved, and the fact that in some situations
the extension given to balance the lengthy FDA tests is not long enough,
it must be remembered that Congress meant the 1984 Act as a compro-
mise. The goal was not only to protect drug companies who develop new
products, but also to get cheaper drugs out to the consumers. And in
situations like Burroughs' AZT, where the company more than recouped
their investment in the first year, there really is no acceptable argument.
IX. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ALLOWING DRUG COMPANIES TO
PATENT LIFE-SAVING DRUGS
The potential problems with allowing drug manufacturers to patent
life-saving drugs are three-fold. First, many drug companies seem to be
pushing prices to the limit that the market can bear. One should note
that the goal of a patent is not solely to reward an inventor, but to get
inventions of value to the public quicker.54 In this light it might seem
Business Brief, Testing Time for Drugs, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1982,
at 75. Though these articles are all pre-1984 act, they help to understand
the great expense and lengthy FDA time losses involved. It is likely both
the expense and testing times have continued their dramatic escalation.
" "[W]e must bear in mind that it was not alone to reward the'inventor
that the patent monopoly was granted. The public was to get its reward
and have the advantage of the inventors discovery as early as was reason-
ably possible." Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105 (C.C.P.A. 1937).
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unreasonable to give a patent (and/or extension) to a company who prices
a drug such that it remains largely out of reach of the public. More
importantly, it seems impractical to give an exclusive license on some-
thing that people can, literally, not live without.6 5 Because of the demand,
the companies really can price the drugs as high as they want, and there
will still be buyers- as evidenced by the obscene prices of drugs such as
AZT, Cyclosporine, Monoclate etc. Such corporate conduct is probably
costing the lives of many of those who cannot afford the drugs.
Second, there is a danger of drug suppression. While no cases of this
are cited, it is possible that a drug company given a monopoly advantage
would be on the forefront of technology in the field and would withhold
even newer technology until the first patent's expiration. Where com-
panies are given such advantages and encouragement to pioneer a field
such as that of pharmaceuticals, the danger of suppression exists, espe-
cially where the government assists companies like Burroughs Wellcome
(re: AZT) to become so far ahead of the pack - that it is likely such a
company could safely sit on an AZT "II" until the monopoly period given
on the original AZT runs out. This may not be a serious concern with
ordinary consumer products, but withholding of drugs can literally be a
matter of life and death.5 6
Finally, the high costs of these drugs are driving up the cost of medicine
in general. Medicaid and Medicare can only cover so much, and thus if
indigents are to get the drugs, and cannot afford them, the costs will
naturally be passed on to other medical consumers. If the drug companies
are receiving tens of thousands of dollars for these drugs per user, it is
easy to see how the total cost will accumulate.
Drug companies will cite the excuse: that R&D is an expensive and
risky venture, that they need a substantial number of years to recoup
their expenses, and that, even with the new FDA excess exclusivity pe-
riods, they are not made whole.5 7 As scientific understanding improves,
56 Though not covered within the scope of this paper, the same argument
holds true for many life-preserving patented medical devices, such as ar-
tificial hearts, limbs, iron lungs, dialysis machinery etc. Potential differ-
ences may exist if these devices are bought outright (rather than by dosage),
if brand loyalty is significantly less, or if such devices command any resale
value.
16 But cf. HARRY AUBREY TOULMIN, PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
65 (1939), which says it is likely that this does not happen.
You hear the charge frequently made that the most valuable inventions
which are covered by patents are deliberately suppressed and not put on
the market. Usually these patents are said to be in the hands of very large
companies who have ample financial resources to merchandise these in-
ventions.
Precisely the reverse is true. If it were not for patents, we would have
suppression of ideas and new developments because there would be no en-
couragement to develop these new things to force manufacturers out of the
rut.
Id. 5' See Brand, supra note 1. See also Pollack, supra note 40.
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the FDA testing becomes more detailed, expensive, and the tests even
more numerous and lengthy. The drug companies will also argue that
since the new FDA laws allow the generics to get up to speed quicker
when the exclusivity period lapses, profits reaped by the developers during
the exclusivity period may be the researching companies' last. This has
been viewed with skepticism, in light of the phenomenal amounts being
charged, and the durability of drug company brand name strengths.58
X. CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL SOLUTIONS
It thus is justifiable to argue that maybe patenting is not a good idea
in the area of life-saving pharmaceuticals. The most drastic solution, of
course, would be to disallow patenting of drugs deemed "life-saving." This
might present more problems than are resolved, as it would require ad-
ministrative determination of which drugs fall into such a category. And
unless other incentives replace that of an exclusive monopoly, there will
be few attempts to discover or reveal such new drugs.
There are several other options available in order to preserve research
intensive efforts and get new drugs cheaply to consumers. One possibility
is to use government grants as incentives, funding the life-saving drug
research within academic institutions and humanitarian foundations,
rather than in the private sector. Such academic laboratories might be
better in tune with public needs, targeting the most dangerous (rather
than the most widespread) of diseases, and enhancing funding in this
area might prove a solution.
58 It is clear that a drug company's brand name is often more durable than the
patent itself. Doctors, accustomed to prescribing a specific brand during the years
of protection, continue to use that name even after cheaper versions enter the
market. "There is increased public interest in what are called 'generic prescrip-
tions', i.e., getting doctors to eschew brand-name drugs when they prescribe,
instead specifying products that are chemically and therapeutically equivalent
- and much cheaper. Today, only about 12 percent of all new prescriptions are
written generically." Snyder, Prescribing for the Drug Stocks, FORTUNE, Jan. 30,
1978 at 121. "Further, although a patent nominally expires after seventeen years,
large manufacturers have often held de facto monopolies for much longer periods
of time. This is due largely to their ability during the period of patent effectiveness
to create strong brand loyalties in physicians, pharmacists, and consumers."
Brand, supra note 1, at 493.
In addition, it is often the case that the new generic drugs do not replace, but
merely supplement the older drug versions, hence creating long periods of product
profitability.
Nor is AZT likely to be replaced in the near future by another drug. Al-
though another drug is being tested, and a third is on the way, it will be
some time, two years perhaps, before those drugs can be brought to market
.... And anyway, 'new drugs' ... 'are extremely likely to be used in com-
bination with AZT. We'll use combinations of drugs to the best effect, just
as we do in other chemotherapies'.
Furstenberg, supra note 17, at 212.
Note also the Sandoz case, where a company was attempting to tie up drug
time by leaguing itself with a drug servicing company. ANTITRUST AND TRADE
REG. REP., supra note 4.
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Another possibility is to place a cap legislatively on prices which may
be charged for drugs, perhaps tied to the actual expense put into the
research (divided by the number of potential consumers). 59 Research
might then be enhanced by government bonuses for lifesaving drugs.
Alternatively, the system can be pushed totally into the realm of socialism
and governmental paternalism, with the government contracting as a go-
between between the drug companies and consumers: buying the drugs
"wholesale," and retailing them to the consumers at a loss.60
The ultimate problem is that Congress has extended monopolies for the
benefit of R&D intensive companies; companies which in return have
"bitten the hand that feeds them" by charging unreasonably high prices.
Even if "lifesaving-drug" companies should be allowed to patent their
inventions, a strong argument can be made that patent extensions, under
35 U.S.C. § 156, should not be granted. This is because the drug devel-
opment companies, by pricing the drugs so expensively, are using the
initial of the "twin aims" of Congress, rewarding invention, to nullify the
effects of the latter.61 While the second aim was to accelerate entry into
the market of generic drugs, and thus foster reduced prices for consumers,
it clearly was not meant to enable the drug development companies to
maximize their profits during the monopoly period. Congress had the goal
of the consumer in mind throughout the reform. The objectives were to
encourage drug companies to invent and to get the drugs to the market
cheaper. Though the legislation was billed as a compromise position be-
tween the two types of drug companies, it is clear that the consumer was
meant to be the real winner. Congress never intended to force the Amer-
ican consumer into a choice between death or financial ruin.
19 Congress might eventually pass laws to restrain prices[,] ... [b]ut there
does not appear to be much sentiment in Washington for regulation of drug
prices, something that is done in many other countries. Still, analysts say,
if the Government begins paying for drugs through Medicare, it will begin
putting pressure on drug companies to lower prices. That would be the first
step toward price controls.
Pollack, supra note 40.
61 It should be noted that many corporations have been beginning to buy some
drugs wholesale as part of their health plans. "Some corporate health plans are
beginning to buy drugs in bulk for employees." Pollack, supra note 40. Also
relevant is that the government has now set up a fund for those who need AZT,
which Medicaid cannot afford to cover. "Some states are paying for AZT through
Medicaid. Private health insurers are beginning to pay for it. Congress has created
a $30 million fund so that people who need it can get it." Furstenberg, supra note
17. But not all states can afford to subsidize AZT. In California, the maximum
income eligibility bracket for free AZT was recently moved from $44,000 per year
down to $26,540. Elaine Herscher, New AIDS Law Cuts Eligibility for Free Drugs,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Mar. 19, 1991, at A5.
11 See infra note 11, at 7,35 U.S.C. §§ 156, and 355, patent extension provisions,
were added along with the compromise statute 35 U.S.C. § 271, which allows
generic drug companies to get FDA approval, and hence to the market, quicker.
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The optimal solution would be for drug companies to price life-saving
products reasonably. Though they clearly will receive whatever amount
they choose to charge for such wares, it is likely large companies could
still be profitable with substantially lower prices, as the market of those
who could afford the product would correspondingly increase. While mor-
alistic pleas and humanitarian attitudes have no place in a free market
economy, the drug manufacturers should reform, or it is possible that the
pricing of drugs may (and perhaps should) be legislatively taken out of
their hands altogether.

